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The European Political Order and Internet Piracy:
Accidental or Paradigmatic Constitution-Shaping?
Davor Jančić*
Modern age technology spurs legal development – Temporal coincidence of con-
flicting national and Union legislative processes triggers interdependence between
EU and member states – French Loi Hadopi cuts Internet without recourse to a
court – Conseil constitutionnel enshrines Internet as fundamental freedom – EU
telecoms reform incorporates several French fundamental rights safeguards
Introduction: Internet piracy as a constitutional spark
In the autumn of 2007 the European Commission (the Commission) initiated a
set of  complex legislative proposals reforming the telecommunications sector of
the European Union (the Union).1  At that time, the Commission could not have
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* Ph.D. candidate, Faculty of  Law, Economics and Governance, Department of  Law, Institute
of  Constitutional and Administrative Law, Utrecht University. Research for this article was partly
carried out in 2009 while I was a visiting fellow at Centre d’études européennes, Sciences Po Paris. This
article substantially develops my earlier analyses published in ‘Telecoms Reform and Inter-Parlia-
mentary Convergence’, EurActiv, 7 May 2009 <www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/telecoms-reform-
inter-parliamentary-convergence/article-182094> and in M. Fiordalisi, ‘[Telecommunications
sacrificed at the altar of  Sarkozy]’, Corriere delle Comunicazioni, No. 10, 18 May 2009, p. 2. All transla-
tions are author’s own. The author thanks the editors for their valuable comments.
1 The telecoms reform package comprises three Commission proposals initiated under Art. 114(1)
TFEU (former Art. 95 EC): (1) Proposal COM(2007) 697 for a Directive of  the European Parlia-
ment and of  the Council amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework
for electronic communications networks and services [Framework Directive], 2002/19/EC on
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and services [Access Direc-
tive], and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of  electronic communications networks and services
[Authorisation Directive] (Better Regulation Directive); (2) Proposal COM(2007) 698 for a Direc-
tive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks [Universal Service Direc-
tive], Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of  personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer
protection cooperation; and (3) Proposal COM(2007) 699 for a Regulation of  the European Parlia-
ment and of  the Council establishing the European Electronic Communications Market Authority.
This legislative package fell within the ambit of  the renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs,
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imagined that its telecoms package would develop into a ‘fascinating European
legislative episode’2  that could shed some light on ‘the dark and most contested
continent of  European Union scholarship’3  – the relationship between the Union
and its member states. In particular, the provision of  the draft Better Regulation
Directive4  seeking to establish end-users’ freedom of  access to and distribution
of  any lawful online content elicited a strong response in the Union’s only directly
elected institution. The European Parliament embarked on a yearlong adamant
advocacy in favour of  safeguards against excessive and indiscriminate restrictions,
without a prior decision by a judicial authority, of  Internet access of  individuals
breaching online intellectual property rights. This scenario would have already
been a noteworthy course of  action, had it not had a more convoluted plot. Three
events stood out.
First, the invisible hand of  European politics had it that the European Parlia-
ment’s reaction did not originate in Brussels but in Paris, as fallout from the French
political battle for the enactment of  the so-called Loi Hadopi, which would install
a purely administrative procedure for the sanctioning of  illegal downloading of
online content qualifying as intellectual property, such as films, music and soft-
ware. The bone of  contention was whether the prohibition of  Internet access was
the province of  administration or judicature, i.e., whether such prohibition could
be imposed by an administrative organ or only by a judicial body. The French
President, the Government and parliamentary majorities in both Houses of  Par-
liament supported the exclusion of  judicial authorities from the sanctioning pro-
cess, whereas the parliamentary opposition promoted, and, with the assistance of
the French Conseil constitutionnel, successfully defended, the thesis that Internet ac-
cess may not be cut off  without a prior judicial decision. The French theatre of
the battle for ‘Internet freedom’ spread to the Union plane when the MEPs from
the French opposition parties, backed by a somewhat sympathetic Commission,
began to further their countrymen’s cause in Brussels. In reaction, the French
Government garnered support within the Council of  Ministers (the Council) to
suppress this move.
pursuant to which the Commission drafted in June 2005 the i2010 Initiative for a European Infor-
mation Society for growth and employment. The main pillar of  the i2010 Initiative is the creation of
a Single European Information Space, which requires a coherent regulatory framework for the
digital economy. Since many elements of  the Union’s internal market of  electronic communications
had been regulated at the national level, the Commission undertook to harmonise them.
2 Editorial, ‘Internet Piracy and the European Political and Legal Orders’, 5 European Constitu-
tional Law Review (2009) p. 169.
3 Editorial, ‘From Confederacy to Convoy: Thoughts About the Finality of  the Union and its
Member States’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review (2010) p. 2.
4 See supra n. 1 under (1).
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Second, as the June 2009 elections to the European Parliament ended, the new
composition of  the European Parliament abandoned the hitherto resolve, soft-
ened its opposition and, ultimately, gave in to the Council’s refusal to designate
judicial authority as competent to sanction online infringements of  intellectual
property.
Third, the finally adopted Better Regulation Directive seemingly incorporated
some of  the caveats spelled by the Conseil constitutionnel about the presumption of
innocence and proportionality of  restrictions of  Internet access. This would not
be as surprising if  decisions of  the Conseil constitutionnel were binding on the Euro-
pean legislature, but they are not.5  However, if  pronouncements of  national courts
vested with the highest adjudicating authority pervade European laws, this then
vindicates the Treaty postulate that the constitutional principles and fundamental
rights common to the member states lie at the foundation of the European Union.6
The symbiotic nature of  the relationship between the Union and its component
parts – member states, their institutions and core principles guiding the organisation
of  public power – thus becomes more tangible regardless of  territorial and func-
tional limitations inherent in their textual guises.
Since the national and European arenas of  legislative activity were in direct
collision, the EU telecoms reform and French Hadopi saga represent fertile soil
for the exploration of  the non-Treaty development of  the European Union’s
material constitution. Despite subtle variations, most constitutionalists agree that
the Union has its own constitution, composed of  the founding treaties and the
jurisprudence of  the European Court of  Justice but also of  the national constitu-
tions and case-law of  highest national courts.7  What remains opaque is the nature
5 See an insightful analysis of  the European role of  national courts in M. Claes, The National
Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2006).
6 This postulate stems from a joint reading of  Arts. 2 and 6(3) EU, as amended by the Lisbon
Treaty. Art. 2 reads: ‘The Union is founded on the values of  respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of  law and respect for human rights, including the rights of  persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men
prevail’. Art. 6(3) reads: ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of  the Union’s law.’ See
further, A. Bogdandy, ‘A Disputed Idea Becomes Law: Remarks on European Democracy as a Legal
Principle’, in B. Kolher-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds.), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of  the Euro-
pean Union (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield 2007), p. 33-44; A. Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of
EU Law: a Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’, 16 European Law Journal (2010) p. 95-111.
7 See L. Besselink, ‘The Notion and Nature of  the European Constitution After the Lisbon
Treaty’, in J. Wouters et al. (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond Lisbon (Antwerp, Intersentia 2009),
p. 261-279; P. Birkinshaw, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the State’, 11 European Public Law
(2005) p. 31-45; P. Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’, 7 European
Law Journal (2001) p. 125-150; I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’,
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of  the relationships that bind these constituent units together and whether there
is a logically coherent deciphering code that explains the patterns of  their mutual
interaction. These patterns are not only written in the founding treaties or consti-
tutional texts. Treaty letter is best understood as the law on politics, the lowest com-
mon denominator of  conjugated European interest. It is a bare skeleton, whose
living tissue is cast, besides in judicial activity, also in the facts of  the incessant
political process, that universal and inescapable perpetuum mobile of  community
organisation – the law of  politics.8  The legislative dossiers under review lend them-
selves impeccably to this type of  analysis.
This contribution examines cross-level interactions between the national and
European actors involved in the legislative processes of  the Union’s telecoms re-
form and the French Loi Hadopi. The objective is to demonstrate that the underly-
ing inter-institutional interactions within the European Union are not always rooted
in the strictly delimited constitutional competences but that political practice, es-
pecially in politically salient matters, often moulds their rigid edges and produces
unexpected outcomes. This is carried out by delving into the intricacies of  the ex
ante scrutiny by the French and the European Parliament of  the legislative clauses
of  the draft Better Regulation Directive and of  the two French Hadopi statutes
that sanction illegal downloading. We also endeavour to elucidate the reasons for
the European Parliament’s acceptance of  a watered down amendment to this draft
Directive and investigate the influence of  the Conseil constitutionnel’s judgment on
the French and European legislative processes. Attention is further paid to the
political ‘joint venture’ of  chiefly members of  the opposition in the French Parlia-
ment and the French MEPs, as well as to the standpoints of  the French and other
European governments concerning these issues.
27 European Law Review (2002) p. 511-529; V. Röben, ‘Constitutionalism of  the European Union
After the Draft Constitutional Treaty: How Much Hierarchy?’, 10 Columbia Journal of  European Law
(2004) p. 339-377; N. Walker, ‘Big “C” or Small “c”’, 12 European Law Journal (2006) p. 12-14; J.H.H.
Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2003).
8 Defining public law as practice, Loughlin has rightly argued that public law must be conceived
as ‘an assemblage of  rules, principles, canons, maxims, customs, usages and manners that condition
and sustain the activity of  governing.’ The subject of  public law cannot be grasped without under-
standing informal practices that shape the activity of  governing. Therefore, the argument goes,
positive law acquires its meaning only within a context of  conventional understandings, which them-
selves cannot be understood without analysing politics. M. Loughlin, The Idea of  Public Law (Oxford,
Oxford University Press 2004), p. 30-31. In the US, the notion of  a living constitution might be
taken as an ideational parallel. See B. Ackerman, ‘The Living Constitution’, 120 Harvard Law Review
(2007) p. 1738-1812; W.H. Rehnquist, ‘The Notion of  a Living Constitution’, 29 Harvard Journal of
Law and Public Policy (2006) p. 401-415.
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The Loi Hadopi and EU telecoms: Temporal coincidence as a
catalyst of cross-level exchange
On 13 November 2007, the Commission used its legislative initiative to set out a
codecision procedure on the reform of  European telecommunications. As part
of  the legislative package, the draft Better Regulation Directive envisaged, inter
alia, amendments to the 2002 Framework Directive.9  A general objective of  the
latter Directive is to contribute to the convergence of  telecommunications, media
and information technology sectors under a single regulatory framework by
harmonising member state regulation of  the transmission of  content over elec-
tronic communications networks.10  To facilitate its coherent application, the Di-
rective lays down a set of  policy objectives and regulatory principles. Besides
technology neutrality, competition in providing electronic services and consolida-
tion of  the internal market for electronic communications, the Directive obliges
national regulatory authorities to ensure a number of  benefits for EU citizens,
such as: universal access to a minimum set of  services of  specific quality at an
affordable price; the availability of  simple and inexpensive dispute resolution pro-
cedures; the protection of  personal data and privacy; the provision of  clear infor-
mation on the use of  electronic communications services; the recognition of  the
needs of  specific social groups; and the maintenance of  integrity and security of
the services provided. In its proposal, the Commission summarily argued that it
complied with the principle of  subsidiarity, because the proposal ‘concerns an
area in which the Community has already exercised its competence’, and with the
principle of  proportionality because ‘it proposes a minimum level of  harmonisation’
and leaves freedom to the national regulatory agencies or the member states to
define the implementing measures.11
Just ten days later, the French President Sarkozy signed the so-called Élysée
Agreement for the development and protection of  creative works and cultural
programmes on the new networks.12  This agreement was based on the report of
the Commission Olivennes. This one-off  Committee had been formed at the recom-
mendation of  the President of  the Republic and was named after its chairman
9 Directive 2002/21/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  7 March 2002 on
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2002]
L 108/33, 24.4.2002. See supra n. 1 under (1).
10 A wide range of  transmission systems are encompassed, including those conveying signals by
wire, radio, optical means, Internet, fixed and mobile terrestrial networks, radio and television broad-
casting and cable television networks. See Arts. 1 and 2(a) of  the Framework Directive.
11 European Commission, Proposal COM(2007) 697 of  13 Nov. 2007, p. 6-7.
12 Accord pour le développement et la protection des œuvres et programmes culturels sur les nouveaux réseaux
<www.armt.fr/spip.php?article70&lang=en>, visited on 5 Aug. 2010.
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Denis Olivennes, former chief  executive of  Fnac13  and the current director of
the French weekly Nouvel Observateur, who had been appointed by the Minister of
Culture and Communication, Christine Albanel.14  The Committee’s task was to
conduct consultations, hearings and negotiations with representatives of  the mu-
sic, film and other audiovisual industries, then Internet service providers, down-
load platforms and content-sharing sites, such as YouTube and DailyMotion, on
means to combat illegal and promote legal downloading of  content covered by
intellectual property rights.15
The Rapport Olivennes suggested, as one of  the options, to enact a three-stage
warning and sanction mechanism that would empower a public authority or a
court to impose the suspension or termination of  the Internet subscription con-
tracts of  the breaching users and thereby deter future infringements of  intellec-
tual property rights on digital networks. This report also advised obliging Internet
users to secure their Internet connections, failing which they would be held re-
sponsible for any fraudulent use of  these connections.16  The Élysée Agreement
endorsed these conclusions and added that the criminal proceedings and the asso-
ciated penalties foreseen by the French Intellectual Property Code (Code de la propriété
intellectuelle), ranging from three years imprisonment to a € 300.000 fine,17  were
‘completely disproportionate’ given the mass character of  illegal downloading.
For that reason, the French executive preferred to confide the prevention and
punishment of  Internet piracy to a non-judicial body.
The EU telecoms procedure had not advanced beyond the drafting of  a first-
reading report by the European Parliament, when on 18 June 2008 the French
Government submitted to the Sénat the Proposal for a law promoting the distribu-
tion and protection of  creation on the Internet.18  Thus began the shuttle proce-
13 FNAC stands for Fédération nationale d’achats and is an international entertainment retail chain
offering a wide range of  cultural and electronic products, including music, literature, films, video
games, and other products.
14 See the letter of  26 July 2007 reproduced in Rapport de la mission Olivennes sur la protection des
oeuvres culturelles, p. 38-39 <www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/actualites/conferen/albanel/rapportoliven
nes231107.pdf>, visited on 5 Aug. 2010.
15 The essentially President’s initiative was prompted by the facts borne out by the statistical
data presented in the Élysée Agreement, according to which France in 2006 saw a billion illegal
exchanges of  musical and audiovisual works. Moreover, over the period of  five years preceding this
Agreement, the market for discs shrank by nearly 50% in volume and value terms. The production
companies cut their workforce by 30% and terminated 28% of  talent contracts. The number of
creative artists signed up every year dropped by 40%.
16 Rapport Olivennes, supra n. 14, p. 19-22.
17 Art. L335-2(2) thereof.
18 Sénat, Doc. no. 405 of  18 June 2008, Projet de loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur
internet <www.senat.fr/leg/pjl07-405.html>, visited 5 Aug. 2010.
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dure (navette). This statute would make several key amendments to the Intellectual
Property Code.
First, notwithstanding the Commission Olivennes’ recommendation to the con-
trary, the Authority for the regulation of  technical measures (Autorité de régulation
des mesures techniques) was to be substituted with a High Authority for the distribu-
tion of  works and the protection of  rights on the Internet (Haute Autorité pour la
diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits sur internet or Hadopi), after which the bill
was dubbed Loi Hadopi. The Hadopi was envisaged as an independent administra-
tive authority, composed of  a college and a commission for the protection of
copyright, and charged with protecting the works and objects of  intellectual prop-
erty from electronic attacks.
Second, in fulfilling this task, the Hadopi’s Commission for the Protection of
Copyright was to be assisted by public agents, who would be entitled to obtain
from Internet providers documents and data related to the identity, postal ad-
dress, e-mail address and telephone contacts of  the person whose Internet con-
nection had been used to commit acts that infringe copyrighted online content.
Third, the Loi Hadopi was to establish a duty for subscribers, i.e., holders of
Internet access contracts, to ensure that their Internet connection is not used un-
lawfully to access online content protected by copyright.
Fourth, infringements of  the duty to secure one’s own Internet connection
could lead to sanctions, applied gradually in three stages (riposte graduée). The first
step of  this ‘three-strike’ procedure would consist in the sending by the Internet
provider of  an e-mail recommending the infringing subscriber to cease illegal ac-
tivity and informing him of  the sanctions in case of  non-compliance. The second
step would be triggered where illegal downloading would recur within six months
of  the sending of  the first recommendation. In such cases, a new e-mail recom-
mendation would be sent, which could be accompanied by a recommended letter.
The third step would leave the Commission for the Protection of  Copyright the
choice between the following two sanctions: (a) the suspension, after a contradic-
tory procedure, of  Internet access during a period ranging from three months to
one year and the concomitant prohibition of  concluding another Internet sub-
scription contract during this period; or (b) an injunction ordering the infringing
subscriber to take measures to avoid repeating the infringement and to report it to
the Hadopi.19  This last step of  the sanctioning procedure was the most controver-
sial, because it did not require a prior decision by a judicial authority. This provi-
sion became the object of  contestation throughout the World Wide Web and among
the French society, intellectual property associations and other similar organisations,
such as the particularly active La Quadrature du Net. At this phase, there were still
19 All of  these amendments are contained in Arts. 2 and 6 of  the Projet de loi favorisant la diffusion
et la protection de la création sur internet, see supra n. 18.
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no major discrepancies between the legislative processes at the French and the
EU level. Sparks had, however, ignited.
In an early attempt to dissuade the French Government from initiating the Loi
Hadopi, the European Parliament had on 10 April 2008 adopted a resolution call-
ing on the Commission and the member states ‘to recognise that the Internet is a
vast platform for cultural expression, access to knowledge, and democratic par-
ticipation in European creativity’ and ‘to avoid adopting measures conflicting with
civil liberties and human rights and with the principles of  proportionality, effec-
tiveness and dissuasiveness, such as the interruption of  Internet access’.20  Rap-
porteur was Guy Bono, a member of  the French Parti socialiste (PS) and of  the
Progressive Alliance of  Socialists and Democrats (S&D). During the plenary de-
bate, he announced his determination to fight the Loi Hadopi:
I strongly oppose the position of some member states whose repressive measures
are dictated by industries incapable of changing their economic model in line with
the needs imposed by the information society. Cutting off Internet access is a dis-
proportionate measure in view of the objectives.21
Yet the opposition was neither solely French nor solely Socialist. For Olle Schmidt,
a Swedish member of  the Alliance of  Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE),
countering the French Loi Hadopi was the sole reason to vote in favour of  the
resolution:
Since it has been leaked that President Nicolas Sarkozy wanted to transfer the
French experiment to the EU, there is every reason to support a statement to the
effect that this, to put it mildly, would not be appreciated. […] I voted in favour of
a report which I would otherwise have tried to vote down.22
Under the Directive on the provision of  information on technical standards and
regulations of  1998,23  the Commission received the Loi Hadopi and made sub-
20 European Parliament, Resolution on cultural industries in Europe, Doc. no. P6_TA(2008)0123
of  10 April 2008, rapporteur Guy Bono, point 23 <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-0123&language=EN>, visited on 18 Aug. 2010.
21 OJ [2008] Debates of  the European Parliament, 9.4.2008, p. 65. His party colleague, MEP
Vincent Peillon, was equally bitter about the French Government’s Hadopi plans: ‘I supported in
particular one amendment – adopted by a margin of  17 votes – contradicting the repressive strategy
of  a “graduated response” proposed in France […] it would be not only impracticable but danger-
ous to entrust service providers – private companies – with the role of  monitoring and suspending
the Internet connections of  people suspected of  illegal downloading’. OJ [2008] Debates of  the
European Parliament, 10.4.2008, p. 43.
22 OJ [2008] Debates of  the European Parliament, 10.4.2008, p. 44.
23 Directive 98/34/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  22 June 1998, laying
down a procedure for the provision of  information in the field of  technical standards and regula-
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stantive observations on it. The suspension of  Internet access for failure to secure
one’s own Internet connection ‘needs to strike the right balance between the need
to combat online piracy and other important objectives.’ Principally, the Commis-
sion cautioned the French Government to take due account of  the principles of
necessity and proportionality, given that Internet subscribers’ unlawful online
behaviour could already be punished by criminal sanctions pronounced in crimi-
nal proceedings. Further, justification was also requested for entrusting the power
to decide on violations of  intellectual property rights to an administrative body
rather than to a judicial one. Eyebrows were also raised over the lack of  a hearing
prior to the suspension of  Internet access and, notably, over the shifting of  the
burden of  proof.24
When legislative dossiers roam across borders, or how a French
issue became European
It has become a truism that national executives, in order to circumvent opposition
in their member state, frequently use Brussels as a backdoor for introducing legis-
lation. As Herzog and Gerken have argued, this is one of  the causes of  inappro-
priate and progressive centralisation of  powers away from the member states
towards the European Union. Adverse consequences of  such practices for demo-
cratic government are primarily the lack of  adequate deliberation on the national
but often also on the EU scale and the pre-emption of  any effective participation
of  national parliaments and various government departments in decision-making
processes.25  As will be shown, the coinciding agendas of  the EU telecoms reform
and the French Loi Hadopi inversed this hypothesis. In this constellation, the French
and the European Parliament, or at least important parts of  their political groups,
fought for the adoption of  a certain legislative solution, whereas the French and
the European executives opposed it.
On 24 September 2008, slightly more than three months after the French Gov-
ernment had initiated its Loi Hadopi, the European Parliament – on the basis of  a
tions, OJ [1998] L 204/37, 21.7.1998. Art. 8 thereof  obliges the member states immediately to
communicate to the Commission any draft technical regulation and a statement of  the grounds
which make its enactment necessary. The Commission then notifies the other member states of
these measures. Information supplied by the notifying member state is only confidential at its re-
quest. The Commission and the member states may make comments to the notifying member state,
which shall take them into account as far as possible in the preparation of  the technical regulation in
question. Art. 9 specifies the suspensory effects of  this communication procedure.
24 Observations de la Commission européenne sur le projet de loi Hadopi <www.anti-hadopi.fr/post/
2009/04/04/Observations-de-la-Commission-europeenne-sur-le-projet-de-loi-HADOPI>, visited
19 Aug. 2010.
25 R. Herzog and L. Gerken, ‘The Spirit of  the Time: Revise the European Constitution to
Protect National Parliamentary Democracy’, 3 European Constitutional Law Review (2007) p. 211-212.
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report drafted on behalf  of  the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy by
Catherine Trautmann (PS and S&D), former French Minister for Culture – adopted
its first-reading position amending the Commission’s draft Better Regulation Di-
rective.26  The amendment that gave rise to a fierce pan-European debate was
Amendment no. 138 (Bono Amendment). Not featuring in the report itself, this
amendment was tabled in the plenary by MEPs Guy Bono,27  Daniel Cohn-Bendit,
co-chair of  the Greens-European Free Alliance (the Greens), Zuzana Roithová, a
Czech member of  the European People’s Party (EPP) and others and was later
orally amended by rapporteur Trautmann.
This amendment sought to insert into the Framework Directive a new policy
objective for national regulatory authorities requiring them to promote the inter-
ests of  EU citizens, inter alia, by:
applying the principle that no restriction may be imposed on the fundamental
rights and freedoms of end-users without a prior ruling of the judicial authorities,
notably in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union28  on freedom of expression and information, save when public
security is threatened, in which case the ruling may be subsequent.29
Since, therefore, the EU telecoms package would now entrust the suspension of
Internet access to a court and the Loi Hadopi to an administrative organ, and since
France would be obliged to transpose this Directive into its legal order, President
Sarkozy’s plan was eviscerated. Bono quickly confirmed who the true addressee
of  the amendment was: ‘You cannot play with individual liberties like that. The
French Government must revise its copy!’30  In return, Jean-François Copé, leader
of  the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) in the Assemblée nationale retorted
that the adoption of  this amendment was a result of  ‘manipulations of  the French
Socialists’.31
26 European Parliament, Doc. no. P6_TA(2008)0449 <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0449>, visited 6 Aug. 2010.
27 He was not re-elected in 2009 European Parliament elections.
28 Art. 11 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union reads: (1) Everyone
has the right to freedom of  expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. (2) The freedom and pluralism of  the media shall be respected.
29 Amendment no. 138 to Art. 8(4) of  the Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services. See supra n. 1 under (1).
30 C. Erwan, ‘Riposte graduée: Albanel sur la défensive’, Libération, 26 Sept. 2008 <www.
liberation.fr/medias/010133657-riposte-graduee-albanel-sur-la-defensive>, visited 6 Aug. 2010.
31 ‘Jean-François Copé, vous insultez l’Europe’, Libération, 13 May 2009 <www.liberation.fr/
medias/0101566985-jean-francois-cope-vous-insultez-l-europe>, visited 6 Aug. 2010.
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The reaction was immediate. Already during the final plenary session adopting
the Bono Amendment, Dominique Vlasto (UMP and EPP) expressed her regret
of the outcome:
While it seems perfectly acceptable, in practice this amendment introduces a hier-
archy of end-users’ fundamental rights by banning all preventative action without
a prior court ruling regarding the communication and online distribution of con-
tent. Yesterday’s events in a Finnish school32  show more than ever why we
should put in place well-thought-out and proportionate prevention mechanisms.33
When the ensuing negotiations between Minister Albanel and Commissioner for
Information Society and Media, Viviane Reding, failed, President Sarkozy decided
to raise the diplomatic level and write directly to Commission President José Durão
Barroso and request his personal engagement in the matter. In a letter of  4 Octo-
ber 2008, President Sarkozy urged that it is ‘crucial for the Commission to be
vigilant of  the threats that appeared in the European Parliament’ and that it is
‘particularly important that Amendment no. 138 adopted by the European Parlia-
ment be rejected by the Commission’.34  The Commission did not honour the
request.
The French parliamentary scrutiny of the EU telecoms package
Both Houses of  the French Parliament scrutinised the EU telecoms package. Yet
neither the Assemblée nationale nor the Sénat adopted a reasoned opinion that would
directly alert European institutions, and especially the European Parliament, of
their positions.35
32 On 23 Sept. 2008 in the city of  Kauhajoki in West Finland, 22-year-old Matti Juhani Saari
shot dead ten people at the Seinäjoki University of  Applied Sciences, before shooting himself. He
had previously posted videos on YouTube containing threatening messages and footage of  him
shooting at a local shooting range. N. Allen, ‘Finland School Shooting: Gunman Planned Massacre
for Six Years’, Telegraph, 24 Sept. 2008 <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/finland/
3071235/Finland-school-shooting-Gunman-planned-massacre-for-six-years.html>, visited 6 Aug.
2010.
33 OJ [2008] Debates of  the European Parliament, 24.9.2008, p. 47.
34 A. Girardeau. ‘Riposte graduée: les grandes manœuvres de l’Elysée’, Libération, 6 Oct. 2010
<www.liberation.fr/medias/0101121531-riposte-graduee-les-grandes-man-uvres-de-l-elysee>, vis-
ited 6 Aug. 2010.
35 The right of  national parliaments to submit reasoned opinions on the compliance of  draft
EU initiatives with the principle of  subsidiarity to the European Parliament, the Commission and
the Council is one of  the principal instruments of  their ex ante participation in EU decision-making.
Reasoned opinions could, since Sept. 2006, be sent as part of  the informal political dialogue known
as ‘the Barroso initiative’, and since Dec. 2009, as part of  the so-called early warning mechanism, a
procedure of  a narrower scope envisaged in Art. 6(1) of  Protocol no. 2 on the Application of  the
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The Assemblée nationale’s Committee for European Affairs, addressing the Bono
Amendment, found that ‘[t]heir clear intention is to frustrate the implementation
of  the French graduated response’ but merely acknowledged the French authori-
ties’ appraisal that this amendment would not pose an obstacle for the Loi Hadopi.36
Recalling that the COSAC Chairpersons’ meeting, held in Paris on 7 July 2008,
raised the question of  subsidiarity regarding the competence for deciding the
modalities of  combating Internet piracy, the Committee assessed that while the
Commission did indeed seek to extend its competences in this domain, the
subsidiarity problems were solved once the Commission ran into joint opposition
by the member states and the European Parliament.37  During the Committee
debate, Christian Paul (PS) considered it inappropriate to assert national solutions
for the regulation of  downloading, because the problem largely transcended state
borders. Furthermore, referring to President Sarkozy’s lobbying of  the Commis-
sion against the Bono Amendment, he inquired why the President did that if  this
amendment really did not pose any legal problem. He also correctly predicted that
the ensuing parliamentary deliberations on the Loi Hadopi would, as we will see
later, transgress political cleavages.38  The most important conclusion of  the
Committee’s scrutiny was, however, that along with a necessary coordination at
the European level, the combating of  illicit downloading remained the compe-
tence of  the member states.39
The Sénat adopted a European resolution40  on the telecoms package on 22
May 2008.41  Since the Bono Amendment had then still not been proposed, this
resolution could not address it.
Principles of  Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaty of  Lisbon. See also G. Bermann,
‘The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish “No”. National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: An Outsider’s View’,
4 European Constitutional Law Review (2008) p. 453-459; I. Cooper, ‘The Watchdogs of  Subsidiarity:
National Parliaments and the Logic of  Arguing in the EU’, 44 Journal of  Common Market Studies
(2006) p. 281-304; D. Jančić, ‘National Parliaments in the European Union: The Lost and Found of
Europe’s Democracy’, Paper presented at 5th Graduate Conference on the European Union, EU Center of
Excellence, University of  Pittsburgh, 20 March 2010, p. 1-36; J-V. Louis, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish
“No”. National Parliaments and the Principle of  Subsidiarity – Legal Options and Practical Limits’,
4 European Constitutional Law Review (2008) p. 429-452.
36 Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information no. 1162 of  15 Oct. 2008, rapporteurs Pierre Lequiller
(UMP), Michel Herbillon (UMP) and Didier Quentin (UMP), p. 54-55 <www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
13/europe/rap-info/i1162.asp>, visited 10 Aug. 2010.
37 Ibid., p. 55.
38 Ibid., p. 60-61.
39 Ibid., p. 62.
40 European resolutions are adopted under Art. 88-4(2) of  the French Constitution, which reads:
‘In the manner laid down by the rules of  procedure of  each House, European resolutions may be
passed, even if  Parliament is not in session, on the drafts or proposals referred to in the preceding
paragraph, as well as on any document issuing from a European Union institution.’
41 Sénat, Résolution européenne no. 96 of  22 May 2008 <www.senat.fr/leg/tas07-096.html>, vis-
ited 10 Aug. 2010.
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The Loi Hadopi and its hurdles: A political marathon in sprint
mode?
Wishing to secure the deal as soon as possible, the French Government declared
urgency on 23 October 2008. Reacting swiftly, and introducing minor amend-
ments, the Sénat adopted the Loi Hadopi at first reading on 6 November 2008.42
While the suspension of  Internet access by Hadopi was maintained, the bill now
mitigated the sanction regime to enable the Hadopi not only to suspend but also to
limit Internet access. Also, the shortest duration of  the suspension of  Internet
access was reduced from three months to one.
During the preparatory phase, the report of  the Sénat’s Committee for Cultural
Affairs had taken due account of  the Bono Amendment, but concluded nonethe-
less that the Loi Hadopi did not run counter to it in any respect. In reaching this
conclusion, the Committee relied, inter alia, on the following two arguments de-
rived from the European level.
First, the Committee referred to a statement by Commissioner Reding’s spokes-
person of 6 October 2008 on the Bono Amendment:
The Commission respects this democratic decision of the European Parliament, in
our opinion this amendment is an important reaffirmation of the fundamental
principles of the legal order of the European Union, especially the citizens’ funda-
mental rights. The amendment leaves to the member states the freedom to strike a balance
between the several related fundamental rights, particularly the rights to respect for private
life and property and effective remedies and information and freedom of expres-
sion.43
The Committee interpreted the Commission’s position as confirming France’s
competence to balance intellectual property rights with those related to Internet
access. The Sénat was, therefore, free to proceed with the Loi Hadopi.
Second, the Committee invoked the Promusicae judgment of  the European Court
of  Justice of  January 2008, which tackled ‘the question of  the need to reconcile
the requirements of  the protection of  different fundamental rights, namely the
right to respect for private life on the one hand and the rights to protection of
property and to an effective remedy on the other.’44  The Court of  Justice ruled
42 Sénat, Doc. no. 8 of  30 Oct. 2008, Projet de loi adopté par le Sénat après déclaration d’urgence favorisant
la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet <www.senat.fr/leg/tas08-008.html>, visited 9 Aug.
2010.
43 Sénat, Commission des affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales, Rapport no. 53 sur le projet de loi favorisant
la diffusion et la protection de la création sur Internet of  22 Oct. 2008, rapporteur Michel Thiollière (UMP),
p. 41 [emphasis in original] <www.senat.fr/rap/l08-053/l08-053.html>, visited 8 Aug. 2010.
44 ECJ 29 Jan. 2008, Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de
España SAU, para. 65.
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that, when transposing and implementing directives, the member states must bal-
ance fundamental rights fairly, proportionately and in accordance with the general
principles of  Community law.45  The Sénat utilised these findings of  the Court of
Justice to claim that the Loi Hadopi fulfilled these requirements. On the one hand,
the Sénat argued that no Community text affirmed that Internet access is a funda-
mental right, an argument that had also been defended by an MEP, unsurprisingly
an MEP from UMP, Jacques Toubon. On the other hand, the principle of  propor-
tionality was held to be observed because: (a) the suspension of  Internet access
would only come after a series of  prior notifications and in case of  multiple recidi-
vism; (b) an alternative sanction in the form of  an injunction was also envisaged;
and (c) the suspension of  Internet access referred only to the connection or place
where the violation has been committed.46
In the Sénat plenary debate of  29 October 2008, rapporteur Thiollière (UMP)
remarked that the Bono Amendment ‘provoked numerous reactions, because some
are trying to instrumentalise the debate on this draft directive in order to block the
French approach.’47  It should be noted that the insistence on the French approach
was also driven by the desire to defend the exception culturelle française and thus main-
tain specificity, prestige and leadership within the Union.48  After its adoption, the
bill was sent to the Assemblée nationale.
45 Ibid., para. 68 reads: ‘the member states must, when transposing the directives […], take care
to rely on an interpretation of  the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck between the
various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order. Further, when implementing
the measures transposing those directives, the authorities and courts of  the Member States must
not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those directives but also make sure
that they do not rely on an interpretation of  them which would be in conflict with those fundamen-
tal rights or with the other general principles of  Community law, such as the principle of  propor-
tionality’.
46 Sénat, Commission des affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales, see supra n. 43, p. 44-45. According to
an oft-invoked Government’s illustration, the suspension of  Internet access foreseen by the Loi
Hadopi encroaches on citizens’ freedom less than the withdrawal of  one’s driving licence does, be-
cause losing a driving licence prohibits the sanctioned driver from driving any vehicle, whereas the
Loi Hadopi allows the sanctioned subscriber to access the Internet in all other places except for that
where the infringement of  intellectual property occurred.
47 Sénat, Compte rendu intégral, Séance du mercredi 29 octobre 2008, JORF [2008] S. (C.R.) 84, 30.10.2008,
p. 6347.
48 Witness the intervention by senator Richard Yung (PS) during the same debate: ‘[…] the
defence of  creators must be at the heart of  our preoccupations. The respect for their rights is an
imperative that constitutes our specificity and our French cultural policy. The stakes are immense,
because we must protect this unique system in Europe – and, probably, also in the world – if  we do
not want to go under the yoke of  the Anglo-Saxon culture’ (p. 6361). By the same token, Minister
Albanel declared that ‘the French ambition in [the area of] culture is that Europe watches with great
attention what we are going to do regarding illegal downloading, especially because there are other
experiences elsewhere. In a very recent letter, Viviane Reding assessed the English experience as an
attempt at good practices, which takes place outside state intervention and the French experience’
(p. 6364). Sénat, Compte rendu intégral, see supra n. 47.
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After a protracted period of  heated parliamentary discussion at first reading,
the Assemblée nationale adopted the Loi Hadopi, as amended, on 2 April 2009.49  The
sanction of  limiting Internet access was deleted and the shortest period of  sus-
pension of  Internet access extended to two months. The debates of  the bill were
replete with references to the EU level.
The Committee for Laws rejected the amendment moved by Patrick Bloche
(PS) incorporating the Bono Amendment into the Loi Hadopi. The main reasons
for the rejection were that: (a) under the 1950 European Convention of  Human
Rights (ECHR)50  France owes and fulfils the duty to provide fair trial and respect
the principle of  the presumption of  innocence, and the Loi Hadopi conforms to it;
(b) recourse to a court – albeit a posteriori – remains possible; (c) Internet access is
not a fundamental right; and (d) it is the competence of the Conseil constitutionnel to
reconcile the related rights.51  For Minister Albanel, the thesis that the Loi Hadopi
is a liberty killer stemmed from a ‘bizarre interpretation’ of  the Bono Amend-
ment.52
The Committee for Cultural Affairs, in its opinion supporting the Government’s
position,53  argued that the Legal Affairs Committee of  the European Parliament
itself  had advised in favour of  a graduated response when it assessed that ‘the
protection of  copyright, other related rights and intellectual property is an impor-
tant element of  the guarantee of  economic competitiveness of  the European
Union.’54
49 Assemblée nationale, Doc. no. 249 of  2 Apr. 2009, Projet de loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de
la création sur internet modifié par l’Assemblée nationale en première lecture <www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
13/ta/ta0249.asp>, visited 9 Aug. 2010.
50 See Art. 6(1), first sentence, and (2) of  the Council of  Europe’s Convention for the Protection
of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concluded in Rome in 1950: (1) In the determina-
tion of  his civil rights and obligations or of  any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law. […]; (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
51 Assemblée nationale, Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de
la République, Compte rendu no. 28, Séance de 9h 30, mercredi 18 février 2009, p. 11 <www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/08-09/c0809028.asp>, visited 9 Aug. 2010.
52 Assemblée nationale, Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de
la République, Compte rendu no. 27, Séance de 16h 15, mardi 17 février 2009, p. 7 <www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/08-09/c0809027.asp>, visited 9 Aug. 2010.
53 Assemblée nationale, Commission des affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales, Avis no. 1481 sur le projet de
loi, adopté par le Sénat, favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet of  18 Feb. 2009, rappor-
teur Muriel Marland-Militello (UMP), p. 33 <www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rapports/r1481.asp>,
visited on 9 Aug. 2010.
54 Parlement Européen, Commission des affaires juridiques, Rapport no. 2008/2121(INI) sur le droit d’auteur
dans l’Union européenne of  26 Jan. 2009, rapporteur Manuel Medina Ortega (S&D), point 15.
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Conversely, in the plenary session of  11 March 2009, Patrick Bloche (PS) at-
tacked the Government for ignoring the recommendations and positions adopted
at the European level:
Beyond this [Bono] amendment that bothers you so much, the European Com-
mission remains very reticent to the idea of entrusting the power of suspension [of
Internet access] to an administrative organ, underlining very justly that ‘the reality
of the current use of the Internet goes far beyond access to content’. Indeed, the
Commission reminded you, as we do today, that a growing number of public ser-
vices are provided through the Internet, a means that is increasingly replacing the
more traditional channels of communication.55  I invite you to read or re-read the
resolution on cultural industries of the European Parliament adopted on 10 April
2008 by 586 votes to 36.56  […] Until when will the Government pretend that
these European recommendations do not exist?57
In the plenary session the following day, Martine Millard, member of  the Parti de
gauche (PG) in the Assemblée nationale, also complained that ‘the sanction chosen by
the Government is contrary to the recent positions of  the European Parliament.’58
She emphasised that the European Parliament’s Committee for Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) had in February 2009 unanimously adopted a
report drafted by Stavros Lambrinidis (PASOK and S&D), in which it warned
that governments and private societies should not deny Internet access as a sanc-
tion.59  The European Parliament was, thus, in her eyes, clearly against the gradu-
ated response foreseen by the Loi Hadopi. The Socialists agreed that this European
Parliament’s report was remarkable and continued vehemently to defend the Bono
Amendment, arguing that those 88% of the MEPs who adopted this amendment
‘wanted to send a message not only to national parliaments but more broadly to
our fellow citizens of  the European Union.’60  They further considered that, in the
55 See supra n. 24.
56 See supra n. 20.
57 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, Séance du mercredi 11 mars 2009, 189e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009] A.N. (C.R.) 34, 12.3.2009, p. 2505. N.B. The Official Journal erro-
neously states that the plenary took place in 2008, whereas it took place in 2009. The reference in
this footnote is correct. His party colleagues, Didier Mathus and Sandrine Mazetier, made the same
arguments about the Government’s disregard of  this European Parliament’s resolution.
58 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, Séance du mercredi 12 mars 2009, 191e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009] A.N. (C.R.) 35, 13.3.2009, p. 2564. N.B. The Official Journal erro-
neously states that the plenary took place in 2008, whereas it took place in 2009. The reference in
this footnote is correct.
59 Parlement européen, Commission des libertés civiles, de la justice et des affaires intérieures, Rapport no.
2008/2160(INI) contenant une proposition de recommandation du Parlement européen à l’intention du Conseil sur
le renforcement de la sécurité et des libertés fondamentales sur Internet of  25 Feb. 2009, rapporteur Stavros
Lambrinidis (S&D), point Q.
60 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, see supra n. 58, p. 2577.
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case of  the Loi Hadopi, developments at the European level should prompt action
at the national level. In this sense, Didier Mathus (PS) asserted with regard to the
suspension of  Internet access that:
If all democratic states have abandoned this possibility, that is because they had
some reasons to do so. These reasons were quite convincingly formulated in vari-
ous texts of the European Union, such as the Commission’s observations or the
recent report on education, not to mention the Bono Amendment […].61
Rather vivid plenary debates occurred in the Assemblée nationale in late March and
early April 2009. Deputies Bloche (PS) and Millard (PG) again invoked the
Lambrinidis Report to reaffirm the standpoints presented therein that Internet is
becoming ‘an indispensable tool for the promotion of  democratic initiatives’ and
that its suspension is contrary to the rights to education, culture, freedom of  in-
formation, job search, and social integration. Minister Albanel laconically discarded
this report because ‘it has no legal value’. In reply, deputies Lionel Tardy (UMP)
and Christian Paul (PS) contended that although the report was indeed not legally
binding on France, this did not mean that it was devoid of  any effect. In their
view, the European Parliament’s pronouncements embodied in the Bono Amend-
ment and the Lambrinidis Report were a true barometer of  the European public
opinion and exhibited this institution’s orientation towards recognising Internet
access as a fundamental right. Sandrine Mazetier (PS) added that such Government’s
attitude, in the dawn of  European elections, emitted a signal to the candidates
intending to run for these elections that their future careers would practically be
futile.62  A representative of  Nouveau Centre (NC), Jean Dionis du Séjour, argued
that the European Parliament’s vote was firm proof  that the Government’s unwa-
vering refusal to reconsider its position juridically isolated France.63  Even the com-
munists, who are traditionally unenthusiastic towards European integration, were
in favour of  relaying opinions of  the European Union whenever these opinions
promoted civic liberties.64
61 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, 2e séance du jeudi 12 mars 2009, 192e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009], A.N. (C.R.) 35[2], 13.3.2009, p. 2601. N.B. The Official Journal
erroneously states that the plenary took place in 2008, whereas it took place in 2009. The reference
in this footnote is correct.
62 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, Séance du lundi 30 mars 2009, 207e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009], A.N. (C.R.) 42, 31.3.2009, p. 3083-3085, 3087 and 3089.
63 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, 2e séance du mardi 31 mars 2009, 210e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009], A.N. (C.R.) 43[2], 1.4.2009, p. 3189.
64 See intervention by Jean-Pierre Brard, Parti communiste français (PCF) in Assemblée nationale, Compte
rendu intégral, 2e séance du mercredi 1er avril 2009, 212e séance de la session ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009],
A.N. (C.R.) 44[2], 2.4.2009, p. 3259.
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The voices of  dissent could also be heard from the deputies of  the ruling
UMP, as the attentive reader will already have noticed. On the one hand, Patrice
Martin-Lalande agreed with the opposition wondering why the suspension of
Internet access should be retained if  the European Parliament had massively out-
lawed it and if  it otherwise diverges from the European developments.65  On the
other hand, the force of  the European Commission’s arguments had persuaded
Lionel Tardy to support an opposition amendment seeking to prevent Internet
users from being simultaneously pursued in two proceedings – before the Hadopi
for illegal downloading and before a criminal court for counterfeiting. As he ex-
plained:
[T]he European Commission had explicitly stated that this bill [Loi Hadopi] had to
guarantee that the envisaged measures satisfied the criteria of proportionality. It
has particularly emphasised the need to exclude the possibility to institute, con-
comitantly, both a penal and an administrative proceeding for the same offence.
Our amendment intends to conform to the observations of the European Com-
mission […]66
Eventually, this amendment failed. Rapporteur Franck Riester (UMP) encapsu-
lated the Government’s stance very well in saying that ‘the French Parliament must
be able to continue to pass statutes without permanently waiting for what the
European Union will decide.’67  Evidently, therefore, all opposition struggles,
whether corroborated with arguments from the European level or not, failed to
perturb the Government. After the first reading in both Houses of  Parliament,
the suspension of  Internet access remained one of  the sanctions for illegal down-
loading.
Calling all passengers traveling to the Assemblée: Vote the Loi
Hadopi !
Since the Government had declared urgency, the Commission Mixte Paritaire was
convened after the first reading.68  With regard to the suspension of  Internet ac-
cess, the joint text mirrored that adopted by the Assemblée nationale at first read-
65 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, Séance du mercredi 1er avril 2009, 211e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009] A.N. (C.R.) 44, 2.4.2009, p. 3226 and 3235.
66 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, 2e séance du mercredi 1er avril 2009, 212e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009], A.N. (C.R.) 44[2], 2.4.2009, p. 3258.
67 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, see supra n. 65, p. 3226.
68 Art. 45(2) French Constitution.
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69 Commission Mixte Paritaire, Rapport Assemblée nationale no. 1589 et Sénat no. 327 of  7 April 2009,
rapporteurs Franck Riester (UMP, Assemblée) and Michel Thiollière (UMP, Sénat), p. 68
<www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rapports/r1589.asp>, visited 10 Aug. 2010.
70 C. Alix, ‘Hadopi: «Retour le 27 avril», selon le ministère de la Culture’, Écrans, 9 April 2009
<www.ecrans.fr/Rejet-d-Hadopi-Un-piege-selon-le,6914.html>, visited 11 Aug. 2010; ‘Projet de loi
Hadopi: pour ses opposants, “le Titanic a coulé”‘, Le Monde, 9 April 2009 <www.lemonde.fr/
technologies/article/2009/04/09/projet-de-loi-hadopi-pour-ses-opposants-le-titanic-a-coule_
1178869_651865.html>, visited 11 Aug. 2010.
71 Roger Karoutchi (UMP), Secretary of  State for the Relations with the Parliament, pressed for
the application of  financial sanctions for repeated absenteeism, as laid down in the Rules of  Proce-
dure of  both Houses of  Parliament. ‘Copé veut “changer de méthode” pour lutter contre
l’absentéisme des députés’, Le Monde, 15 April 2009 <www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/04/
15/cope-veut-changer-de-methode-pour-lutter-contre-l-absenteisme-des-deputes_1180747_823448.
html>, visited 11 Aug. 2010. A study carried out on the occasion of  this very vote revealed that in
the period from July 2007 to April 2009, 142 members of  the Assemblée nationale made less than 10
interventions either in plenary or in committee. ‘Qui sont les fantômes de l’Assemblée?’, Le Monde,
21 April 2009 <www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/04/21/qui-sont-les-fantomes-de-l-
assemblee_1183311_823448.html>, visited 11 Aug. 2010.
72 J-M. Ayrault et al, ‘On ne s’excuse pas d’avoir rejeté Hadopi’, Libération, 27 April 2009
<www.liberation.fr/medias/0101564207-on-ne-s-excuse-pas-d-avoir-rejete-hadopi>, visited 11 Aug.
2010.
73 Art. 45(4) of  the French Constitution reads: ‘If  the joint committee [Commission Mixte Paritaire]
fails to agree on a common text, or if  the text is not passed as provided in the foregoing paragraph,
the Government may, after a further reading by the National Assembly and by the Senate, ask the
National Assembly to reach a final decision. In such an event, the National Assembly may recon-
sider either the text drafted by the joint committee, or the last text passed by itself, as modified, as
the case may be, by any amendment(s) passed by the Senate.’
ing.69  The joint text was adopted by the Sénat on 7 April 2009. Two days later, in a
surprise vote, the Assemblée nationale rejected it with 21 votes against and 15 votes
in favour, out of  a total of  577 deputies, i.e., slightly more than 6% of  the mem-
bers. The Government explained that this ‘commedia dell’arte pathétique’ or ‘manœuvre
dérisoire’ happened because some fifteen Socialist members had hidden themselves
in one of  the corridors of  the Palais Bourbon only to rush into the hemicycle at the
very moment of  the vote.70  This event further fuelled a debate on the chronic
absenteeism in the French Parliament.71  Yet while the irked Élysée and Matignon
were reining in their party colleagues in the Assemblée nationale, the Socialists re-
fused any responsibility claiming, among other things, that the Loi Hadopi is ‘an
already broken and ineffective Maginot Line. Technically, there are means on the
Internet to bypass it. Juridically, the evolution of  the European legislation contra-
dicts it at its very base.’72
Making use of  a possibility provided for by Article 45(4) of  the Constitution,73
the Government re-introduced the bill on 11 April 2009 and a new reading began
in the Assemblée nationale. In the plenary sessions preceding the vote, the
Government’s party reiterated that ‘the French Parliament does not receive any
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orders from the European Parliament.’74  But if  the European Parliament’s amend-
ments were truly that irrelevant, the opposition pressed the Government to ex-
plain why it resisted them so forcefully:
Madam Minister, your intervention in the beginning of the session will greatly
weaken the representatives of France in Brussels. When our permanent ambassa-
dor to the European Union says tomorrow morning that the telecoms package
should not be adopted as it is and that the procedure should be blocked in the
higher interest of culture – nobody doubts that such will be his mandate – what
will the European commissioners reply, Madam Reding above all? They will bran-
dish the declarations of Madam Albanel in the French Parliament. ‘The Bono
Amendment? But your Minister of Culture said yesterday that it is of no impor-
tance whatsoever. Is that why you want to block the telecoms package?’ Who will
be right? Madam Albanel in Paris or the ambassador to the European Union in
Brussels?75
All the more so given the Commission’s warning that ‘European institutions should
not let themselves be utilised for the attainment of  purely national blueprints at
the Community level.’76  However, the questions remained largely unanswered.
Finally, when the opposition, underpinning its reliance on the European Parlia-
ment, highlighted in a plenary debate of  7 May 2009, precisely one month before
the European election, that the European Parliament enjoys ‘the greatest legiti-
macy in a democracy, that of  universal suffrage’, Franck Gilard (UMP) derided
the argument: ‘Who cares about the European Parliament! […] Being an MEP is a
knockabout farce!’77
The relentless efforts of  the opposition, therefore, did not bear fruit. On 12
May 2009, the Assemblée nationale adopted the Loi Hadopi without amending the
suspension of  Internet access, followed by the Sénat’s approval the next day. The
aforesaid surprise rejection of  the bill would now have been avenged, had the
opposition not taken the matter before the Conseil constitutionnel. Meanwhile, the
EU debate had set the European Parliament and the Commission against the
Council of  Ministers.
74 See intervention by Philippe Gosselin (UMP) in Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral,
2e séance du mercredi 6 mai 2009, 235e séance de la session ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009] A.N. (C.R.)
55[2], 7.5.2009, p. 4087.
75 See intervention by Christian Paul (PS) in Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, see supra
n. 74, p. 4092.
76 See intervention by Patrick Bloche (PS) in Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, see supra
n. 74, p. 4095.
77 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, 2e séance du jeudi 7 mai 2009, 237e séance de la session
ordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009] A.N. (C.R.) 56[2], 8.5.2009, p. 4166.
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Coalitioning at the Union plane: An unrelenting Council and a
flirtatious Commission
On 6 November 2008, the Commission amended its proposal and in principle
accepted the Bono Amendment because it:
serves as a useful restatement of principles applying independently of this provi-
sion, and […] leaves member states to ensure that a fair balance is struck between
the various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order, in par-
ticular, the right to respect for private life, the right to protection of property, the
right to an effective remedy and the right to freedom of expression and informa-
tion.78
The Commission also declared that it ‘understands that this issue is of  high politi-
cal importance in the domestic debate in France’ and invited the French Govern-
ment to discuss its views with the other 26 member states.79
For its part, the Council, in a public deliberation of  27 November 2008, and
with the abstentions of  Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, reached
a political agreement rejecting the Bono Amendment.80  On the basis of  this agree-
ment, the Council, with the same member states abstaining, adopted its common
position at first reading on 16 February 2009 rejecting this amendment.81  Neither
of the three abstaining member states did so because of the Bono Amendment,
however.82  The main forces behind the rejection were President Sarkozy and the
French Government.
At its second reading, on 6 May 2009, the European Parliament refused to
endorse a last chance compromise thrashed out with the Council, and instead
reinstated the Bono Amendment verbatim and renumbered it 46.83  Whereas an
78 European Commission, Amended proposal COM(2008) 724, p. 15 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0724:FIN:EN:PDF>, visited 12 Aug. 2010.
79 Press Release, Doc. no. MEMO/08/681 of  7 Nov. 2008.
80 Press Release, Doc. no. PRES/08/345, 2907th Council meeting ‘Transport, Telecommunica-
tions and Energy’ of  27 Nov. 2008.
81 Council of  the European Union, Common position, Doc. no. 16496/08 of  9 Feb. 2009
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/st16496.en08.pdf>, visited 12 Aug. 2010.
See also Press Release, Doc. no. PRES/09/33 of  16 Feb. 2009.
82 Council of  the European Union, Doc. no. 5905/09 of  11 Feb. 2009 <http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st05/st05905-ad01re02.en09.pdf>, visited 12 Aug. 2010. For ex-
ample, the Dutch delegation abstained because it had ‘great difficulty with the central role of  the
European Commission in the regulation of  telecoms markets. The national regulators should have
more latitude to take account of  specific market circumstances and not be able to be overruled by
the Commission in doing so.’
83 European Parliament, Doc. no. P6_TA(2009)0361, p. 37 <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2009-0361+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>,
visited 12 Aug. 2010.
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overwhelming majority of  the MEPs had, during the plenary debate the day be-
fore, opposed the suspension of  Internet access without a prior judicial decision,
some of  them also carped at the Loi Hadopi. For instance, Bruno Gollnisch, a
non-attached MEP from the French Front national, urged the European Parlia-
ment to block the Loi Hadopi, which for him is ‘worthy of  communist China or
other totalitarian regimes.’84  However, the criticism of  the Loi Hadopi did not only
come from the French MEPs. David Hammerstein, a Spanish member of  the
Greens, was also quite vocal in his criticism:
At this very moment, Mr Sarkozy is challenging the European institutions over the
future of the Internet. What is our response going to be? Are we going to remain
silent and not answer? What is the position of the European Union and the Com-
mission with regard to the new Hadopi Law on graduated response? […] We
should listen to the vast majority of Europeans, particularly young people who
have grown up in the digital era […] What the immense majority does not want is
for operators to become digital police, spies, both judges and litigators who
marginalise the normal legal procedures of a democracy. That must be made
clear.85
In similar vein, Hanne Dahl, a Danish member of  the Independence/Democracy
Group, was ‘concerned that the French culture minister still believes that it ought
to be possible to shut off  access to the Internet administratively after “three
strikes”.’86
At last, as the adoption of  the Loi Hadopi and the European Parliament’s deci-
sion at second reading practically coincided, Bono exhorted Commissioner Reding
to launch infringement proceedings against France. As the EU legislative proce-
dure had not yet ended, Reding could not legally reprimand Paris: ‘This is a sover-
eign decision of  the French assembly on a French law. Not everything that I do
not like politically is also illegal.’87  Less than a month before the European elec-
tions, the political reason for the Commission’s unwillingness to confront France,
so Bono believed, lay in Barroso’s aspiration for a second term as Commission
President and, hence, in his hesitancy to antagonise the French President, who
could thwart his ambition within the European Council.88
84 OJ [2009] Debates of  the European Parliament, 5.5.2009, p. 9.
85 Ibid., p. 10-11.
86 Ibid., p. 11.
87 L. Phillips, ‘Commission Gives Paris a Pass Over Piracy Bill’, EUobserver, 14 May 2009 <http:
//euobserver.com/?aid=28127>, visited 18 Aug. 2010.
88 The procedure for appointment of  President of  the European Commission is laid down in
Art. 17(7)(1) EU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty: ‘Taking into account the elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting
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The Conseil constitutionnel taming the shrew: Internet as a
fundamental right
In its judgment of  10 June 2009,89  the Conseil constitutionnel declared the Loi Hadopi
partially unconstitutional. Two decisions most relevant for Internet access are as
follows.
1. The duty of Internet subscribers to monitor their Internet connections may be established
in order to ensure that access to these connections is not used for online ac-
tivities that infringe intellectual property rights.90  In other words, in order to
stay within the boundaries of law, Internet subscribers should secure their
Internet connections, for instance by setting passwords or installing security
devices, so that neither their household members nor other third persons
can use them to illegally download works protected by copyright or other
related rights.
2. The suspension of Internet access may not be established as an administrative penalty for
failure to monitor one’s own Internet connection. Therefore, even where an
Internet subscriber, intentionally or unintentionally, does not secure his or
her connection, he or she must continue to be able to access the Internet
using his or her connection.91  However, an Internet subscriber not comply-
ing with the duty to monitor his or her connection can, in principle, suffer
another, less strict, sanction. The Conseil Constitutionnel gave three reasons
for shielding the right to access to the Internet.
First, the suspension of  Internet access infringes the freedom of  expression and
communication laid down in Article 11 of  the Declaration of  the Rights of  Man
and the Citizen of  1789.92  This freedom implies the freedom to Internet access
by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of  the
Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of  its com-
ponent members. If  he does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a
qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the
European Parliament following the same procedure.’
89 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision no. 2009-580 of  10 June 2009 <www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2009/2009-
580-dc/decision-n-2009-580-dc-du-10-juin-2009.42666.html>, visited 13 Aug. 2010.
90 Ibid., para. 7.
91 There are other ways to access the Internet, such as at work, in Internet cafés, or using other
people’s Internet connections. However, both the Loi Hadopi and the Conseil constitutionnel’s judg-
ment deal with accessing the Internet using one’s own Internet connection.
92 Art. 11 of  the Declaration of  the Rights of  Man and the Citizen of  1789 reads: ‘The free
communication of  ideas and opinions is one of  the most precious rights of  man. Every citizen may
thus speak, write and publish freely, except when such freedom is misused in cases determined by
Law.’
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93 Conseil constitutionnel, see supra n. 89, para. 12.
94 Ibid., para. 15.
95 Ibid.
96 Relevant passages of  the judgment suggest that the unconstitutionality of  the suspension of
Internet access did not stem from the nature of  the Hadopi as an administrative authority, but rather
from the extent of  the sanctioning power vested in it. According to the Conseil constitutionnel, no
constitutional principle or rule, including the separation of  powers, precludes an administrative
authority from imposing penalties aimed at protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights and free-
doms (para. 14). Also, on the basis of  Art. 34 of  the French Constitution, the Parliament is at liberty
to reconcile the objectives of  safeguarding intellectual property distributed online with the freedom
of  expression and communication (para. 15). Restrictions on the freedom of  expression and com-
munication may thus be established, but only proportionately to the purpose that any such restric-
tion seeks to achieve. This means that the French Constitution does not require the legislature to
empower a court of  law to sanction Internet subscribers; it can just as well be an administrative
authority. In the case of  the Loi Hadopi, however, the sanction of  suspending Internet access was
found too harsh and, therefore, disproportional to the goal of  protecting online intellectual prop-
erty. It is, hence, the nature of  the sanction rather than that of  the sanctioning authority, that was
found unconstitutional. As a corollary, only a court of  law may hand down such a drastic sanction.
97 Conseil constitutionnel, see supra n. 89, para. 16.
not only because of  the current state of  the means of  communication and the
generalised development of  the public communication services, but also because
Internet access is important for the participation in democracy and the expression
of  ideas and opinions.93  The freedom of  expression and communication, which
henceforth encompasses Internet access, is ‘all the more precious since it is one
of  the cornerstones of  a democratic society and one of  the guarantees of  respect
for other rights and freedoms.’94
Second, although Parliament, under Article 34 of  the Constitution, is indeed
empowered to reconcile the objective of  combating online infringement of  intel-
lectual property with that of  safeguarding the freedom of  expression and com-
munication, any restriction of  this freedom must be necessary, suitable and
proportionate.95  The suspension of  Internet access does not fulfil this require-
ment because: (a) an administrative authority, unlike a court of  law, may not be
entrusted such a far-reaching power of  sanction;96  (b) it does not differentiate the
Internet subscriber, i.e., the holder of  an Internet access contract, from the actual
user; (c) it is not limited to a certain category of  persons but refers to the entire
population; and (d) it can lead to a restriction of the freedom of expression and
communication even in one’s home.97
Third, the suspension of  Internet access violates the principle of  the presump-
tion of  innocence enshrined in Article 9 of  the Declaration of  1789. The burden
of  proof  must not be placed on the Internet subscriber but on the Hadopi. It must
not be presumed that it was the Internet subscriber who committed an online
infringement of  intellectual property. In other words, the subscriber must be not
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98 Ibid., paras. 17 and 18.
99 Sénat, Doc. no. 498 of  24 June 2009, Projet de loi relatif  à la protection pénale de la propriété littéraire
et artistique sur internet <www.senat.fr/leg/pjl08-498.pdf>, visited 16 Aug. 2010.
100 Art. L335-7(1) of  the Code de la propriété intellectuelle as amended by Art. 7 of  the Loi Hadopi II.
101 Art. 398-1(1), point 10 of  the Code de procédure pénale as amended by Art. 6(1) of  the Loi
Hadopi II. As a rule, the tribunal correctionnel is composed of  a president and two judges (Art. 398(3)
of  the Code de procédure pénale).
102 In French criminal law, offences are typified according to severity. Minor offences are contra-
ventions, which are divided into five classes. Class five contraventions are the most severe. Offences of
intermediate severity are délits and the most severe ones crimes.
103 Art. 434-41(1) of  the Code pénal as amended by Art. 11 of  the Loi Hadopi II.
104 These sworn public agents, who assist the Hadopi, are appointed by organisations for profes-
sional protection or the French National Cinematographic Centre and sworn before a competent
judicial authority. Their task is to register online infringements of  intellectual property materials and
be obliged to prove that the infringement was committed by a third party. Instead,
it must be up to the Hadopi to prove the subscriber’s guilt.98
Therefore, the Conseil constitutionnel ruled that, in France, Internet access is a
fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Constitution and that it can only be re-
stricted by a court. Yet were the reverberations of  this ruling felt beyond France?
The Loi Hadopi II and the EU telecoms package: An unexpected
epilogue
In order to supplement the Loi Hadopi and bring it into harmony with the judg-
ment of  the Conseil constitutionnel, the Government initiated on 24 June 2009 an
accelerated legislative procedure of  a bill on the penal protection of  literary and
artistic property on the Internet (Loi Hadopi II ).99  This bill sought to introduce in
the Intellectual Property Code the suspension of  Internet access of  up to one
year as a supplementary sanction for counterfeiting offences committed online
and the prohibition of  concluding another Internet access contract during this
period.100  While the Hadopi would be permitted to determine these offences, the
power to impose the suspension of  Internet access was to be entrusted to a court,
the tribunal correctionnel, composed, by way of  exception, of  a single judge.101  Where
foreseen by Government regulations, Internet access suspension for up to one
month would also be applicable to persons found guilty of  committing class five
minor offences foreseen by the Intellectual Property Code.102  Further, the viola-
tion of  the prohibition of  concluding another Internet access contract was to be
punishable by imprisonment of  two years and a fine of  30.000 euros.103  Persons
suspected of  having committed acts of  counterfeiting online, who therefore faced
the supplementary sanction of  the suspension of  Internet access, were merely to
enjoy the right to send their observations to the Hadopi’s Commission for the
Protection of  Copyright and sworn public agents.104  The subscriber whose Internet
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refer such cases to the Hadopi for action to be undertaken against the Internet subscriber identified.
105 See interventions by senator Nicole Borvo Cohen-Seat (PCF) in Sénat, Compte rendu intégral,
Séance du mercredi 8 juillet 2009, session extraordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009] S. (C.R.) 81, 9.7.2009,
p. 6818; by deputy Brard (PCF) in Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, Séance du mardi 21 juillet
2009, 25e séance de la session extraordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009] A.N. (C.R.) 94, 22.7.2009, p. 6687;
and by Bloche (PS) in Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, 2e séance du mardi 21 juillet 2009,
26e séance de la session extraordinaire 2008-2009, JORF [2009], A.N. (C.R.) 94[2], 22.7.2009, p. 6743.
106 Assemblée nationale, Doc. no. 337 of  22 Sept. 2009, Projet de loi relatif  à la protection pénale de la
propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet (texte définitif) <www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/ta/ta0337.asp>,
visited 16 Aug. 2010.
107 Art. 331-21-1 of  the Code de la propriété intellectuelle as amended by Art. 1 of  the Loi Hadopi II.
access would be suspended would nonetheless, as in the Loi Hadopi, remain under
a duty to honour his or her Internet provision contract and continue to pay the
fees to the Internet provider. When the judicial decision would become execut-
able, the Hadopi would notify it to the Internet provider for execution.
In the preparatory proceedings, some of  the opposition members of  both the
Assemblée nationale and the Sénat argued that the Conseil constitutionnel had confirmed
the Bono Amendment and even made it the very foundation of  its decision.105
The bill was adopted by both Houses of  Parliament after the Commission Mixte
Paritaire had convened. While the described Government’s provisions passed, the
negotiations in the Parliament had inserted a host of  significant amendments.106
Above all, the rights of  the accused Internet subscriber were strengthened be-
yond the mere sending of  observations to the Hadopi. They now included the
rights: (a) to be notified of  the right to send observations; (b) to request to be
heard, in which case the Hadopi shall grant this right; (c) to be assisted during the
hearing by a counsel of  his or her choice; and (d) to receive a copy of  the minutes
of  the hearing.107  Moreover, in its first e-mail recommendation, the Hadopi must
inform subscribers of  the possibility of  having their Internet access suspended as
a supplementary sanction should violations be detected. Similarly, the sending of
the second e-mail recommendation must, unlike in Loi Hadopi, be accompanied
by a letter sent by post. In addition, the Hadopi’s Commission for the Protection
of  Copyright was placed under a duty to delete the personal data about the con-
victed Internet subscriber upon the expiration of  the period of  the suspension of
Internet access. Another novelty is that the Internet access of  subscribers who
have committed class five minor offences may only be suspended in case of  gross
negligence and where the Hadopi has previously sent the subscriber a letter by post
inviting him or her to secure his or her Internet connection. Finally, as a counter-
balance to these amendments, which are favourable to Internet subscribers, it was
agreed that the decision on the suspension of  Internet access may be handed
down in a summary procedure in the form of  a penal order, during which the
accused disposes of  less procedural rights. In sum, the Conseil constitutionnel ’s find-
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108 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision no. 2009-590 of  22 Oct. 2009 <www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
decision//2009/2009-590-dc/decision-n-2009-590-dc-du-22-octobre-2009.45986.html>, visited 16
Aug. 2010. The only provision of  the Loi Hadopi II that the Conseil constitutionnel found unconstitu-
tional was the one allowing the injured party, where offences of  intellectual property committed
online are tried in the summary procedure by means of  a criminal order, to claim damages and, as
the case may be, oppose the criminal order. This provision is unconstitutional because the Parlia-
ment did not fully exercise the power to lay down rules of  criminal procedure, vested in it pursuant
to Art. 34 of  the French Constitution. Namely, the Parliament did not determine the manner in
which a claim for damages may be brought; it did not specify the effects of  opposing the criminal
order; and it did not establish the right of  the accused to limit his or her opposition solely to the civil
or solely to the criminal provisions of  the criminal order.
109 Conciliation Committee, Joint Text, Doc. no. PE-CONS 3677/09 of  12 Nov. 2009 <http:
//register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st03/st03677.en09.pdf>, visited 17 Aug. 2010.
110 Recital 4 Better Regulation Directive.
111 Art. 1 Better Regulation Directive inserting para. 3(a) in Art. 1 Framework Directive.
ings on the obligatory intervention of  a court if  Internet access is to be suspended
and the principle of  presumption of  innocence had been taken into account.
Admittedly, the court proceeding had become simplified and greatly assisted by
the work of  the Hadopi. Yet it is the judicial and not the administrative authorities
that are henceforth competent to render the final decision denying Internet ac-
cess. This did not appease the opposition, which took the Loi Hadopi II before the
Conseil constitutionnel. This time, however, without success. Save for one relatively
minor point, the Conseil constitutionnel, in its decision of  22 October 2009, approved
the Loi Hadopi II.108
Soon thereafter, the draft Better Regulation Directive entered the last decision-
making stage. The Conciliation Committee agreed a joint text on 4 November
2009. The compromise, reached by unanimity, had yielded the following legisla-
tive solutions.109
First, it was recognised in the Preamble that the Internet was ‘essential for
education and for the practical exercise of  freedom of  expression and access to
information’ and that ‘any restriction imposed on the exercise of  these funda-
mental rights should be in accordance with the European Convention for the
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’110  Herewith, access to
the Internet is promoted to the level tantamount to that of  a fundamental right.
Second, the Framework Directive was amended to oblige the member states,
when taking measures regarding end-users’ access to or use of  the Internet, to
respect natural persons’ fundamental rights and freedoms as flowing from the
ECHR and the general principles of  Community law.111  Compared to the Bono
Amendment, reference to the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights had been
dropped, which, according to Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D), had a clear advantage
because all member states are signatories of  the ECHR, whereas Britain and Po-
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112 OJ [2009] Debates of  the European Parliament, 24.11.2009, p. 37. Art. 1(1) Protocol no. 7
on Application of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union to Poland and to the
United Kingdom reads: ‘The Charter does not extend the ability of  the Court of  Justice of  the
European Union, or any court or tribunal of  Poland or of  the United Kingdom, to find that the
laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of  Poland or of  the United King-
dom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.’ See
further, C. Barnard, ‘The “Opt-Out” for the UK and Poland From the Charter of  Fundamental
Rights: Triumph of  Rhetoric Over Reality?’, in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU
Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty (Wien, Springer 2008), p. 257-284. In addition, Czech
Republic has secured a political promise that its opt-out from the Charter would be enacted in the
next EU accession treaty.
113 See analyses of  the status of  the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights in different periods of
European integration in A. Knook, ‘The Court, the Charter, and the Vertical Division of  Powers in
the European Union’, 42 Common Market Law Review (2005) p. 367-398; K. Lenaerts and E. de
Smijter, ‘A “Bill of  Rights” for the European Union’, 38 Common Market Law Review (2001) p. 273-
300; I. Pernice, ‘The Treaty of  Lisbon and Fundamental Rights’, in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The
Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty (Wien, Springer 2008), p. 235-256; B.
de Witte, ‘The Legal Status of  the Charter: Vital Question or Non-Issue?’, 8 Maastricht Journal of
European and Comparative Law (2001) p. 81-89.
114 Art. 1 Better Regulation Directive inserting para. 3(a) in Art. 1 Framework Directive.
115 Council of  the European Union, Doc. no. 16481/09 of  7 Dec. 2009, p. 14 <http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16481-ad01.en09.pdf>, visited 17 Aug. 2010. See supra
n. 82.
land have opted out from the EU Charter.112  Yet since the member states are
bound by the ECHR and the general principles of  Community law irrespective of
any express mention thereof in EU legislation, the said opt-outs from the EU
Charter and its disappearance from the text of  the Directive altogether do not
prejudice the gist of  this provision.113
Third, any member state measure restricting individuals’ fundamental rights
and freedoms related to the Internet may only be imposed if  the following two
classes of  guarantees are afforded. On the one hand, any such measure must be
‘appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a democratic society.’ On the
other hand, a series of  safeguards must be provided: a prior, fair and impartial
procedure; the right to be heard; the right to privacy; the presumption of  inno-
cence; due process; effective judicial protection; effective and timely judicial re-
view; and, possibly, other adequate procedural safeguards in conformity with the
ECHR and with general principles of  Community law.114
The Council adopted the joint text on 20 November 2009, with the Nether-
lands abstaining for the same considerations as in the second reading, which, again,
did not refer to the right to Internet access.115  Four days later, the European Par-
liament followed suit. The European Parliament had, therefore, succumbed to the
Council’s and the Commission’s pressure and agreed that the Bono Amendment’s
reference to a prior ruling of  the judicial authorities be abandoned. But why did
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116 European Parliament, Report at III reading, Doc. no. A7-0070/2009 of  16 Nov. 2009, rap-
porteur Catherine Trautmann, p. 6-7 <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT
&reference=A7-2009-0070&language=EN>, visited 17 Aug. 2010. As reported herein, in some
member states a prior court decision is not requisite for action to be taken against an individual. An
example is that, in many member states, cases involving online dissemination of  child pornography
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the European Parliament give in? The reasons for the shift revolved around the
argument that the Bono Amendment was ultra vires, and could, therefore, not be
pursued. Perhaps more momentous was the fact that this argument was, as we
demonstrate hereunder, not only furthered by the Council, but was, without much
contestation and due to the rising sense of  political expediency, also espoused by
the European Parliament itself.
(a) Council pressure. Already at the first conciliation trilogue of  29 September
2009, the Swedish Presidency explained that the member states were opposed to
the Bono Amendment because the legal basis for the proposed directive, namely
Article 95 EC, which allows harmonisation of  the internal market, did not authorise
the Union to regulate the structure of  national judiciaries, including in matters of
criminal law.116
(b) European Parliament’s internal endorsement of  the compromise. At the request of
the European Parliament’s conciliation delegation, the European Parliament’s Le-
gal Service issued on 12 October 2009 its opinion on the freshly contentious mat-
ter of  Community competence. The Legal Service found that the Bono
Amendment ‘appears to entail a partial harmonisation of  the organisation and the
remit of  the judiciary in the member states’ and that it, therefore, falls outside the
scope of  Article 95 and Community competence. Besides, neither the right to a
fair trial nor the right to an effective remedy, as laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of
the ECHR respectively, require a prior court ruling.117  The view of  the Legal
Service was not isolated. That the Bono Amendment exceeded the European
Parliament’s Treaty powers was also supported by Siiri Oviir, an Estonian member
of  ALDE, a lawyer by vocation.118
(c) Responsibility for the reform. A more orthodox, albeit in this case not impal-
pable, explanation lies in the reluctance of  the European Parliament to bear the
brunt of  the then looming Union’s failure to carry out this comprehensive reform
of  European telecommunications over a point that was, despite its importance,
largely collateral to the already agreed main reform lines. In this respect, the Euro-
pean Parliament resigned itself  to the conclusion that ‘the agreement reached goes
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much further than what was possible at earlier stages of  the procedure’,119  and, as
rapporteur Trautmann asserted, ‘the result obtained was the maximum that Parlia-
ment could obtain with the legal basis we had.’120  Commissioner Reding’s reminder
corroborates this reasoning: ‘[…] you know how much time we need in order to
set up new legislation – so that by the time we arrive at an agreement, the world
has already advanced so much that we should start from the beginning again.’121
It is fair to assess the European Parliament’s success as partial. The insistence
on form, i.e., on a court decision, was dropped in favour of  substance, i.e., the
incorporation of  the aforesaid safeguards.122  In a plenary session of  the Euro-
pean Parliament the day before the vote, Philippe Lamberts, a French member of
the Greens, a group that had initiated the Bono Amendment, was actually de-
lighted with the result achieved and assured the House that had the European
Parliament not voted twice for this amendment, the compromise would not have
been obtained.123  Some MEPs claimed that history in telecoms had been writ-
ten.124  Even the Swedish Pirate Party was satisfied. Their representative, Christian
Engström, reckoned that the compromise was a signal to member states not to
pursue measures resembling President Sarkozy’s Loi Hadopi or Lord Mandelson’s
Digital Economy Act.125  However, the truth of  the matter is that the EU telecoms
package, enacted on 25 November 2009, does not, as Gollnisch MEP rightly un-
derlined,126  forbid Hadopi-like laws or authorities to be erected.
Concluding remarks
The tale of  the legal enshrinement of  the Internet as a fundamental freedom in
France and in the European Union is one where neither the national nor the Union
institutions refrained from influencing the legislative process unwinding at the
‘other’ level. The Commission and the European Parliament first admonished the
French Government. The French opposition then connived with their counter-
parts in the European Parliament to obtain the Bono Amendment and then use it
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to curb the Government. The Government then lobbied the Commission and the
Council. Furthermore, while the French parliamentary majority relied in part on
the European Court of  Justice’s judgment, the opposition turned to the Conseil
constitutionnel for support. Although the Conseil constitutionnel ’s key finding on the
requirement of  a court for the suspension of  Internet access was not embraced,
its considerations on the principles of the presumption of innocence and neces-
sity and proportionality of  Internet access restrictions echoed in the Better Regu-
lation Directive. The very petition to the Conseil constitutionnel had in turn echoed
the Commission’s remarks on the Loi Hadopi. Therefore, although the Council
refused to entrust the suspension of  Internet access to courts, it had not totally
ignored the Conseil constitutionnel’s and, indirectly, the wishes of  the French opposi-
tion and the European Parliament. The strings had, thus, become tremendously
reticulate.
In the end, the protagonist of  this entire legislative episode, President Sarkozy,
accomplished his goal in Brussels, but failed in Paris. A Pyrrhic victory it is, for an
EU directive does not trump the Conseil constitutionnel’s judgments. Regardless of
the outcome, it is remarkable that parliaments from different levels of  governance,
to a certain extent, fought back jointly, even though this is not what one would
ordinarily expect. Thus, after the coalition of  the French national and European
deputies had obtained in Brussels the insertion in draft EU legislation of  a judicial
procedure for the suspension of  citizens’ Internet access, these arguments from
the EU level were unsparingly employed in the French Parliament, and particu-
larly in the Assemblée nationale, to buttress the political pressure on the executive
branch. Parliaments, in their French and European seats, have displayed their abil-
ity to challenge their executive rivals in multilevel games, albeit not perforce to
defeat them. So, what do these cross-level exchanges tell us about the nature of
the Union’s constitution?
The EU telecoms reform and the Loi Hadopi are solid examples of  interdepen-
dence between the Union and its member states, between their institutions and
their respective legislative and judicial processes. George Scelle’s famous dédoublement
fonctionnel is, after all, not the only channel of  influence in the Union.127  Indirect
interdependences arise, too, whereby, as I have argued elsewhere, actors within
the European constitutional order not only directly interact with but also shape
their action in relation to the action performed by or attributable to the institu-
tions legally established outside their own legal system.128  What qualifies the scope
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of  this argument is whether such interdependence materialises casuistically, in
isolated cases of  temporal coincidence of  conflicting legislative processes at the
national and EU levels, or whether it reveals a broader and more purposeful phe-
nomenon of  cross-level interplay.129  If  the EU telecoms case should appear to be
merely incidental, one would not err if  he were to consider that such cases, with
the augmented powers of  the European and national parliaments in EU affairs,
might occur more frequently, and become in future perhaps even paradigmatic of
the manner in which the Union’s unwritten constitution evolves.
Two conclusions are certain, however. It is politics as a process that crosses
levels, not its institutional incarnations. And European politics does not only mean
EU politics; it is also means, and not to a small extent, national politics.
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